In a significant relief for Mr. Khatri, the Rajasthan High Court ruled that his adult, married son has no right to stay in his house without his permission. The decision reinforces Mr. Khatri’s exclusive ownership and his authority to determine who may occupy his property, offering a firm affirmation of a father’s property rights.
On October 28, 2025, the High Court held that an adult, married son cannot reside in his father’s home without the father’s explicit consent.
The Court described the case as an unfortunate property dispute between a father and son that had persisted for five years, observing that such conflicts reflect a decline in ethical and moral values. In the litigation, the son appeared as the appellant–defendant, while the father contested as the respondent–plaintiff.
The dispute centred on a 90×112 sq. ft. plot located in Sawai
Madhopur District, Rajasthan, which was reportedly purchased jointly by Mr. Khatri and his brother, Radheshyam, in a Nagar Palika auction on August 21, 1974. The sale deed was subsequently registered in their joint names before the Sub-Registrar, Sawai Madhopur, on September 19, 2003.
Mr. Khatri informed the Court that the plot had later been amicably divided between the brothers, with the western portion—measuring 45×112 sq. ft.—allocated to him. A written document recording this mutual partition was executed on August 25, 2003. He also stated that he constructed a residential house on his share and is its absolute owner and exclusive occupant.
He further stated that after his son’s marriage, he permitted his son and daughter-in-law to use two bedrooms, two storerooms, a kitchen, and a bathroom situated in the southern portion of the house. According to Mr. Khatri, his son occupied that area solely with his consent and as a licensee.
Mr. Khatri also claimed that his son had begun behaving in a disruptive manner, causing him ongoing mental anguish. Due to this conduct, he asked his son—who was residing there with his wife—to vacate the premises. The son, however, disregarded the request and continued to subject him to ill-treatment.
As a result, on November 26, 2018, Mr. Khatri issued a legal notice to his son via Registered Post, formally withdrawing the permission and licence earlier granted to him. He also called upon his son to vacate the occupied portion of the house and hand back possession.
Mr. Khatri additionally sought mesne profits of ₹15,000 per month from his son for the continued use and occupation of that part of the property until it is returned to him.
In response, the son’s counsel rejected the accusations, terming the allegations false and distorted. The son asserted that he was residing in the property as an owner, not as a licensee.
Consequently, Mr. Khatri instituted a Civil Suit on January 16, 2019, seeking a mandatory injunction directing his son to vacate the premises and restore actual possession of the portion he occupied. He also claimed mesne profits of ₹15,000 per month from the date of filing the suit, along with a permanent injunction against his son.
Instead of honouring his father’s request, the son chose to contest the proceedings and filed a written statement on May 14, 2019.
In his written statement, the son sought to refute Mr. Khatri’s assertions by alleging that Plot No. 1 had been purchased at auction by his father and uncle using income from their HUF firm, M/s Panna Lal Prem Raj Khatri. He also claimed that the property was originally acquired by his grandfather, Shri Bal Mukand Ji Khatri, who had constructed two residential units on it for his sons—plaintiff Shyam Sundar and his brother, Radheshyam.
The son consistently asserted that the property belonged to the HUF and that, as a coparcener, he had an inherent share in it.
He further claimed in his written statement that after his marriage in 2004, the 45×112 ft. portion allegedly allocated to his father was orally partitioned. As per his version, the southern segment of the house measuring 55×45 sq. ft. was allotted to him, while the northern portion was given to his younger brother.
He contended that from that point onward, he became the rightful owner of his share of the property and had been residing there in that capacity.
He categorically denied being a licensee of Mr. Khatri or residing in the house with his father’s permission. On this basis, he filed a counter-claim seeking a permanent injunction restraining his father from interfering with his proposed construction of a first floor on what he claimed to be his portion of the property.
Mr. Khatri filed a rejoinder, asserting, among other points, that the firm Panna Lal Prem Raj Khatri was a partnership firm and not an HUF entity, and therefore the property could not be treated as HUF property. He maintained that he was the sole owner and possessor of the house and that his son had no right, title, or interest in it.
He unequivocally denied that any oral partition of the constructed property had ever occurred between his two sons. Mr. Khatri also firmly rejected his son’s counter-claim asserting coparcenary rights or ownership over the property and urged the Court to dismiss the counter-claim in its entirety.
On October 28, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court delivered its judgment in favour of Mr. Khatri. Speaking to ET Wealth Online, Sachin Bhandawat, Partner at Khaitan & Co., observed:
“The Rajasthan High Court has reaffirmed a well-established principle of Indian succession law: adult children have no inherent right to reside in or claim their parents’ self-acquired property. Such property, purchased from a parent’s personal income, remains solely under their control during their lifetime. A child may reside there only with the parent’s permission, not as a matter of legal entitlement.”
Bhandawat explained that when a property is part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or is ancestral, all coparceners share a collective interest and joint possession. Each coparcener acquires rights in such property by birth, including the right to use and enjoy it. Preventing any coparcener from exercising these rights constitutes ouster, for which a court may grant an injunction to protect their interests.
He further noted that the judgment draws a clear distinction between self-acquired and ancestral property—upholding an individual’s exclusive ownership while acknowledging the shared rights inherent in HUF property. In this case, the son failed to establish that the property was jointly owned or enjoyed. Therefore, correctly identifying the nature of a property is crucial in determining the legitimacy of legal claims and residence rights.
Rajasthan High Court examined the property dispute between the father and son
In its judgment ([2025:RJ-JP:42107]) dated October 31, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court observed that, upon admitting the second appeal, it had formulated the following substantial questions of law for examination:
- Whether the trial court could validly issue an eviction decree in a suit seeking a mandatory injunction, despite the absence of any finding establishing a licensor–licensee relationship between the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, the father) and the defendant (the son)?”
- Whether the appellate court was justified in setting aside the trial court’s finding that no licensee relationship existed, while simultaneously upholding the trial court’s decree?”
- Whether the trial court and the appellate court erred in interpreting the evidence on record while passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, the father) and subsequently affirming it on appeal?
- Whether a decree in favour of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri) can be validly granted despite the alleged non-establishment of material facts and insufficient proof of the claims made in the plaint?
Substantial Questions of Law No. (I) & (II):-
The Rajasthan High Court observed that both questions of law revolved around the existence of a licensor–licensee relationship between Mr. Khatri and his son.
It noted that the trial court and the first appellate court had concurrently held that the defendant, being the plaintiff’s son, was residing in the disputed house solely with his father’s permission and not as a licensee.
Since Mr. Khatri, the plaintiff, had withdrawn his consent, the defendant (his son) could be directed to vacate the portion of the property he occupied and restore possession to his father, as the property is the father’s self-acquired asset.
During the hearing, the Senior Counsel representing the appellant/defendant (the son) contended that Mr. Khatri had, in the plaint, referred to his son as a licensee.
The son’s counsel contended that, since both the trial and appellate courts had found that the defendant was not a licensee of Mr. Khatri, the plaintiff’s suit should have been dismissed. He further argued that, as the plaintiff’s natural-born son who was born in the very house in dispute, the defendant could not be considered a licensee. Accordingly, in the absence of a licensor–licensee relationship, a suit seeking a mandatory injunction was not maintainable.
The Rajasthan High Court noted that, while the arguments presented by the son’s Senior Counsel might appear convincing at first glance, a careful and comprehensive reading of the plaint clarified the true intent. Although Mr. Khatri used the term “licensee” in Paragraphs 4, 6, and 8, it was meant only to indicate that his son had been residing in the house with his permission. Once that permission was withdrawn, the son no longer retained any right to occupy that portion of the property.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that, at this stage, it is important to underscore that the factual findings of both lower courts—derived from a careful evaluation of oral and documentary evidence—unequivocally establish that the disputed property is not HUF property but the self-acquired property of the plaintiff, Mr. Khatri. These findings remain uncontested. The Court further noted that the defendant (the son) has not appealed against the dismissal of his counter-claim, a fact confirmed by his own Senior Counsel.
Rajasthan High Court relies on Delhi High Court precedent
The Rajasthan High Court noted that the Delhi High Court, in Ramesh Kumar Handoo v. Shri Binay Kumar Basu [MANU/DE/8953/2007], had considered a similar issue in a second appeal.
In that case, the father filed a civil suit seeking a mandatory injunction against his married daughter and son-in-law, requesting them to vacate the property and restore possession. The Delhi High Court held that a married daughter is in the same position as a married son. It observed that since the father was the perpetual licensee of the property on which the house stood, and the daughter and her husband were residing there solely with his permission, they were obliged to vacate once that permission was withdrawn. The Court further affirmed that a suit for a mandatory injunction in such circumstances is maintainable.
The Delhi High Court’s reasoning was grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew [(2005) 7 SCC 667].
The Supreme Court, in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha v. Manhabalal Jeram Damodar [(2013) 15 SCC 358], examined the meaning of the term “license” under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. In Paragraph 53 of its judgment, the Court clarified that a licence does not necessarily require payment of a fee; it may also be gratuitous. In other words, a licensor may permit someone to enter or occupy property without any monetary consideration.
Based on this, the Rajasthan High Court held that, in view of the factual findings of the lower courts and the legal precedents discussed, the proposed questions of law do not arise in the present second appeal.
Substantial Questions of Law No. (III) & (IV)
The Rajasthan High Court observed that the defendant-son’s only defence was that he was occupying the disputed portion of the property not as a licensee but as a co-parcener or owner. He asserted that the property formed part of the HUF; however, this claim—and his counterclaim—remained entirely unsubstantiated. Both courts, after examining the evidence presented by both sides, concluded that the defendant had produced no document or material to show that the property belonged to an HUF or to establish his status as a co-parcener or owner. These findings, based on a proper appreciation of the evidence, could not be termed perverse.
The Court further noted that the defendant had not filed any appeal challenging the dismissal of his counterclaim.
The Rajasthan High Court emphasised that the defendant-son had wholly failed to demonstrate any right, title, or interest in the suit property, beyond showing that his possession was merely permissive. In contrast, the plaintiff—Mr. Khatri (the father)—had established his absolute ownership of the property through both oral and documentary evidence.
These factual conclusions remain uncontested in the present second appeal, a position expressly acknowledged by the appellant–defendant’s Senior Counsel during arguments.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that the defendant’s (son’s) possession of a portion of the property can be understood as a natural circumstance, since a child typically resides in the father’s home during childhood out of love, affection, and the father’s parental duty.
The Court further noted: “Once a child reaches majority and enters married life, the father’s decision to allow the son or daughter to continue residing in his house or a part of it does not, by itself, confer any legal right over the property. Such possession cannot be considered ownership unless the property is ancestral or forms part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF).”
The Rajasthan High Court also observed that this principle is supported by the Delhi High Court’s decision in Sachin & Anr. v. Jhabbulal [AIR 2017 (Delhi) 1].
In that case, elderly parents were forced to file a civil suit to evict their two married sons from the first and second floors of their residence and to recover possession. They sought a decree for a mandatory injunction directing the sons to vacate the occupied portions and to prevent them from creating any third-party interest in the property. The trial court granted the relief sought, and the sons’ first appeal was subsequently dismissed.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that its power to interfere with the concurrent factual findings of the two lower courts is very limited, being confined only to cases involving a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the CPC.
The Court further noted that the Supreme Court, in a consistent line of judgments, has made it clear that the High Court is not expected to re-examine the entire evidence or substitute its own findings.
When the findings of the lower courts are based on a proper evaluation of the evidence, the High Court does not have the authority to overturn those factual conclusions.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that, for the reasons discussed and in light of the cited precedents, it is firmly of the view that none of the proposed questions of law arise in the present second appeal.
Rajasthan High Court judgement
The Rajasthan High Court noted that, in addition to raising the substantial questions of law—which have already been addressed and decided against the appellant-defendant (son)—the Senior Counsel for the appellant argued that, since the defendant was admittedly in possession of the suit property, the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, the father) should have filed a suit for possession rather than a suit for a mandatory injunction to recover possession from his son.
The Court further observed that the defendant’s (son’s) claim for protection of his possession is unsupported by any legally recognized right. His occupation of his father’s property since childhood arises solely from familial love and affection, not from any enforceable entitlement.
The Rajasthan High Court observed: “Once a father becomes dissatisfied with his son’s conduct and no longer wishes for him or his family to reside in his house, the son’s possession cannot be legally protected solely on the basis of their familial relationship.”
The Court further held that the defendant (son), being the natural child of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri) and occupying the property only with his father’s permission as a family member and gratuitous licensee, cannot claim that the plaintiff was obligated to file only a suit for possession.
It was already established that the defendant’s (son’s) occupation of the disputed portion of his father’s property was entirely gratuitous, based solely on the father’s consent, and that the defendant failed to prove any independent legal right over the premises.
The Rajasthan High Court stated: “The permission extended by the father has been revoked, as concurrently found by both courts below. In this factual context, and given the father–son relationship between the parties, a suit for mandatory injunction is maintainable and has been correctly decreed.”
The Court further noted that the defendant (son) had not raised this objection before either the trial court or the first appellate court.
The Supreme Court, in Maria Margadia Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria [AIR 2012 SC 1727], held that a property owner seeking to recover possession may institute an appropriate civil suit—whether for recovery of possession, ejectment of a former lessee, a mandatory injunction directing a person to vacate, or even a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
Applying these principles, the Rajasthan High Court observed that the Madras High Court, in Munusamy v. Duraibabu Mudailar, S.A. No. 133/2016 (decided January 1, 2019), upheld a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate and restore possession of the house. In that case, the dispute arose between two brothers; the elder brother had allowed the younger to reside in his home out of affection. When the younger brother later claimed ownership rights, a suit for a mandatory injunction was filed and granted, and the High Court affirmed the decree.
The Rajasthan High Court further referred to a relevant judgment of the Bombay High Court that directly addressed the issue, namely Conrad Dias v. Joseph Dias [AIR 1995 BOM 210]. In that case, a father filed a suit seeking a mandatory injunction to compel his son to vacate the property. The Bombay High Court held that a person residing in a parental home does not acquire any legal status—certainly not that of a “licensee” under Section 52 of the Easements Act—but resides merely as a family member without any additional legal entitlement. The Court also clarified that a suit for a mandatory injunction is maintainable in such circumstances, even instead of a suit for possession.
In light of this reasoning, the Rajasthan High Court concluded that the trial court was justified in granting a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate the property and restore possession to the plaintiff.
The Court stated: “The objection raised by the Senior Counsel for the appellant (son) at the second-appeal stage is rejected. No other substantial question of law has been raised, nor does any arise in this appeal. In the Court’s view, the present second appeal is without substance and merit.”
The Court further noted that this case is far from a routine dispute. The appellant, the biological son of the respondent (Mr. Khatri, father), is an educated individual fully aware that the property was purchased by his father in his own name, jointly with his brother, and that his occupation of the premises is solely by virtue of being a family member residing in his father’s house.
Rajasthan High Court observed:
“Despite failing to establish his claim of ownership or co-parcenary—and despite both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court rejecting his contention that the property formed part of a HUF—the appellant (son) persisted in pursuing the matter up to the High Court. Such conduct amounts to nothing more than causing unnecessary harassment to his father.”
The Court further noted that, to deter such litigation—which undermines the trust and sanctity inherent in a father–son relationship—it is appropriate to impose costs on the appellant (son).
Judgment: “While the imposition of costs may not fully compensate the father for the agony, distress, and harassment caused by this litigation, it serves as a deterrent against the malicious prolongation of such disputes. The costs are quantified at Rs 1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh), inclusive of litigation expenses, to be paid to the respondent (Mr. Khatri, father). Consequently, the present second appeal is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs 1,00,000 payable by the appellant (son) to the respondent. Any pending application(s) stand(s) disposed of.”
