“A plain reading of Section 17 DV Act confers upon every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. However, it does not create a proprietary interest in the property and is subject to lawful eviction in accordance with due process.”
Delhi High Court: An appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was filed challenging the Family Court’s order dated 22-3-2024 (“impugned order”). By the said order, the Family Court decreed possession, damages, use and occupation charges, along with injunctions, in favour of the respondent. It held that the appellant’s status in relation to the property was merely that of a gratuitous licensee, whose right of residence had already been revoked through notices. Relying on the divorce decree, the Court further concluded that the appellant had no subsisting or enforceable right to continue residing in the premises and accordingly granted six months’ time to vacate.
A Division Bench of Justices Anil Kshetarpal* and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar observed that once a valid decree of divorce dissolves the marriage, the domestic relationship ceases to exist. As a result, the basis for asserting a right of residence under Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act also comes to an end, unless supported by some other statutory entitlement. Finding no infirmity in the Family Court’s ruling, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
Background:
The present appeal arose out of a family dispute concerning matrimonial and property rights. The appellant, daughter-in-law of the original plaintiff (since deceased), had married the respondent’s son on 13-4-1999 according to Hindu rites, and the couple was blessed with a son on 7-2-2000. The dispute pertained to property situated at D-2/217, Sector-11, Rohini, Delhi (“suit property”), which the appellant claimed to be her matrimonial home since marriage.
She asserted that the property had initially been purchased in her husband’s name but was later transferred to the respondent under pressure due to strained family relations. The appellant also contended that she and her family had made financial contributions towards the construction of the property. To support this claim, her brother deposed that he had contributed ₹60,000 in 1998. She further alleged that ancestral resources were also utilized for the construction.
In addition, the appellant accused her husband and in-laws of cruelty and harassment. She also alleged that false accusations were leveled against her regarding an unknown individual residing with her, which ultimately led her husband to initiate divorce proceedings.
In reply, the appellant instituted a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”), which was dismissed as not maintainable, without examination on merits. During the pendency of the civil suit, the respondent passed away and was substituted by his legal heir (daughter). Meanwhile, a decree of divorce was granted on 19-11-2019 and upheld in appeal solely on the ground of limitation. However, the Supreme Court subsequently set aside the decree and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, which is now listed for 9-10-2025.
Notices revoking the appellant’s permission to reside in the property were served on 23-7-2013 and 20-12-2013. Despite this, she neither vacated the premises nor relinquished possession and was alleged to have attempted to sell or create third-party interests in the suit property. Consequently, the respondent filed a suit seeking possession, damages for unauthorized use and occupation, and an injunction restraining the appellant from alienating or encumbering the property.
By its impugned order dated 22-3-2024, the Family Court held that the respondent had proved ownership on the strength of the 2011 Conveyance Deed, whereas the appellant had failed to establish any financial contribution. Even assuming such contribution, the Court observed, it could not displace the respondent’s absolute ownership. It further ruled that the appellant’s status was only that of a gratuitous licensee, whose right of residence stood revoked by the notices. Taking into account the divorce decree, the Court concluded that she had no enforceable right to continue residing in the premises and allowed her six months’ time to vacate.
Accordingly, the Court passed a decree of possession and permanent injunction in favour of the respondent, while rejecting the claim for damages due to lack of evidence. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed the present appeal before the Court.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court observed that Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act confers upon every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of ownership or title. However, this right is not absolute, as it does not create any proprietary interest and remains subject to lawful eviction in accordance with due process. The Court underscored that the protection under Section 17 is contingent upon the subsistence of a “domestic relationship.” Once a valid divorce dissolves the marriage, the domestic relationship comes to an end, and with it, the foundation for asserting a right of residence under the provision—unless another statutory right can be established.
In the present case, the appellant’s marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce dated 19-11-2019. Although that decree was challenged and subsequently remanded for reconsideration, there was presently no subsisting matrimonial bond or domestic relationship between the parties. In the absence of such a relationship, the essential condition for invoking Section 17 of the DV Act was not satisfied. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant’s claim to a continuing right of residence under the Act stood significantly weakened, pending the outcome of her appeal.
Turning next to the question of ownership and possession of the suit property, the Court noted that the respondents relied upon a will dated 20-7-2013, purportedly executed by the deceased respondent in favour of her daughter, whereas the appellant disputed its genuineness, alleging that it was forged and fabricated.
The Court noted that the will had been produced and proved through PW-3, one of the attesting witnesses. Although during cross-examination he could not recall the name of the second attesting witness and faced suggestions of having been monetarily induced, these deficiencies were held insufficient to discredit the core of his testimony or the validity of the execution. Since the document bore the requisite signatures and satisfied the statutory requirements under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court concluded that the will stood duly proved and the respondents’ title flowing from it was beyond challenge.
Relying on the Relinquishment Deed dated 1-11-2016, purportedly executed by the appellant’s husband in favour of his sister, the Court held that the appellant had failed to substantiate her allegation that the deed was a collusive device to defeat her claim of residence. It further affirmed that the Family Court had rightly placed reliance on the registered Conveyance Deed dated 7-6-2011, which independently established that title to the suit property vested in the deceased respondent and thereafter devolved as per the will.
The Court also rejected the appellant’s contention that PW-1’s inability to recall specific details of the property’s original acquisition undermined the case. It held that the evidentiary weight of registered documents remained intact, and the burden lay squarely on the appellant to prove her assertions of contribution or coercion—something she had failed to discharge.
While considering the appellant’s contention that the suit property was ancestral or that her family had contributed to its purchase, the Court found the evidence inadequate to establish any legal or equitable right in her favour. The assertion that her brother had advanced ₹60,000 in 1998 lacked documentary support, and the oral testimony relied upon could not prevail over the registered title documents produced by the respondents. The Court held that such claims of contribution did not confer any enforceable proprietary interest.
With respect to eviction, the Court observed that notices terminating the appellant’s permissive occupation had been issued in 2013, followed by the institution of the possession suit. Upon examining the pleadings and evidence, the Family Court had decreed possession and granted the appellant six months’ time to vacate. Finding the process neither arbitrary nor unfair, the Court upheld the Family Court’s decision and dismissed the appeal along with all pending applications.
