The Supreme Court allowed a Criminal Appeal preferred by a wife against the Order of the Telangana High Court.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) is not a concession for the wife but a legal and moral duty of the husband.
This remark was made in a criminal appeal filed by a wife contesting the Telangana High Court’s ruling.
The two-Judge Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma observed, “We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.”
Brief Facts
The Appellant married in 1999 and gave birth to a son in 2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose, and after returning from the United States in 2005, they began living separately. Their marriage was eventually dissolved through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
Later, the Appellant developed a relationship with her neighbor, the Respondent, and they eventually married. However, the Respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, along with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, seeking annulment of the marriage. The Family Court allowed the petition, declaring their marriage null and void.
In 2006, the Appellant married the Respondent, and their marriage was officially registered, with a certificate issued by the Registrar of Marriage.
The couple had a daughter in 2008, but conflicts later emerged between them. As a result, the Appellant filed a complaint against the Respondent and his family under Sections 498A, 406, 506, and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act).
The Appellant later filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC before the Family Court, which awarded ₹3,500 per month to Appellant No. 1 and ₹5,000 per month to Appellant No. 2. Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Respondent filed a Criminal Revision Petition.
The High Court upheld the maintenance granted to the daughter (Appellant No. 2) but revoked the maintenance awarded to Appellant No. 1, stating that she could not be recognized as the Respondent’s legal wife since her first marriage had not been legally dissolved through a court decree.
Challenging this verdict, the Appellant moved the Supreme Court.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, noted, “The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting. … The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting.”
The Court noted that the Respondent had knowingly married the Appellant not once, but twice. As evidence, the Appellant submitted a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of separation from her first husband. While the Court recognized that this document does not serve as a formal divorce decree, it acknowledged that it clearly reflects the dissolution of their marriage, their separate living arrangements, and the absence of any maintenance support from her first husband.
“Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage”, it further said.
The Court ruled that, given the social justice purpose of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC and the specific facts and circumstances of the case, denying maintenance to the Appellant would be unjust.
“It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations”, it also noted.
The Court acknowledged that the only possible concern in adopting a beneficial interpretation was the risk of the Appellant claiming dual maintenance; however, this was not relevant in the present case.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the maintenance award granted by the Family Court.
