
The Court said there must be references to specific words used, contextual details or any gestures that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which penalizes actions insulting a woman’s modesty, cannot be applied solely based on the use of “filthy language.” There must be contextual elements or accompanying expressions demonstrating an intent to insult the woman’s modesty [Mashushree Datta vs State of Karnataka].
A Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Pankaj Kumar Mishra highlighted the necessity of specific references to the words used, along with contextual details or gestures—whether preceding, following, or accompanying such words—that indicate criminal intent to insult modesty.
“The term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC,” the Court said.
The Supreme Court was examining a case where an employee alleged she was forcibly terminated from her job, with her employer confiscating her laptop containing intellectual property. She also claimed that security personnel escorted her out of the office premises.
Additionally, the employee accused two senior colleagues of using abusive language during her termination.
An FIR was filed against the accused under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
After the High Court refused to quash the FIR and chargesheet, the accused approached the Supreme Court for relief.
The Supreme Court dismissed the charges under Section 509 of the IPC, concluding that the appellants’ actions lacked the intent or awareness required to reasonably infer that their conduct could evoke a significant emotional reaction amounting to an insult to a woman’s modesty.
The Court noted that the woman’s complaint did not indicate that the accused used language specifically directed at her that would qualify as an offence under Section 509 of the IPC.
It further observed that while the chargesheet alleged the accused scolded the complainant using “filthy language,” this claim was not mentioned in the FIR.
“The absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed,” the Court ruled.
The Supreme Court clarified that a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, which addresses causing hurt, requires evidence of a voluntary act resulting in bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to another person. Therefore, actual harm must be established.
For the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506, the Court emphasized that it must be shown the accused intended to cause alarm to the complainant for the charge to hold. In the absence of such evidence, the Court quashed both charges.
Regarding Section 504 of the IPC (intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace), the Court stated that it must be proven, through evidence, that the insult was intentional and carried out with the intent or knowledge that it would provoke a disturbance of public peace or lead to another offence.
The Court concluded that none of the essential elements of Sections 323, 504, 506, or 509 of the IPC were satisfied, even if the complainant’s allegations were assumed to be entirely true.