The Court faulted the police and the trial court for charging a man with voyeurism merely for filming a woman entering a disputed property.
The Supreme Court has held that taking photographs or recording videos of a woman without her consent, while she is engaged in non-private activities, does not amount to voyeurism under Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code [Tuhin Kumar Biswas vs. State of West Bengal].
A bench comprising Justices NK Singh and Manmohan set aside the case against a man who had been accused of voyeurism solely for filming a woman as she entered a disputed property. The Court further remarked that the police and the trial court ought to have exercised greater care while filing the chargesheet and framing charges of voyeurism, particularly in the absence of any substantial basis for such an allegation.
The Court also noted that continuing prosecutions without satisfying the requirement of strong suspicion places an unnecessary burden on the criminal justice system and diverts resources from cases of greater importance.
The matter before the Court stemmed from a long-standing dispute between two brothers over a residential property in Salt Lake, Kolkata. The accused, Tuhin Kumar Biswas, is the son of one of the co-owners, and the FIR arose from an incident linked to this property conflict.
The conflict originated in 2018, when the accused’s father instituted a civil suit against his brother. On November 29, 2018, the civil court directed both sides to retain joint possession of the property and barred them from creating third-party rights.
This injunction was still in force when the complainant, Mamta Agarwal, visited the property in March 2020. Soon after, she filed an FIR—allegedly prompted by the accused’s uncle—alleging that Biswas had unlawfully restrained and threatened her and had taken her photographs and videos without her consent.
On August 16, 2020, the police submitted a chargesheet under Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 354C (voyeurism), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, even though the complainant had refused to record a judicial statement.
After both the trial court and the Calcutta High Court denied his discharge plea, the accused approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court began by outlining the legal principles governing discharge, emphasizing that a case should proceed to trial only if the prosecution’s evidence raises a strong suspicion that the accused may have committed the offence. At this stage, the Court noted, the judiciary functions as a filter to prevent weak or baseless cases from reaching trial.
The Bench then examined whether the FIR and chargesheet established an offence of voyeurism. It clarified that voyeurism is applicable only when a woman is observed or photographed while engaged in a private act—such as undressing, using the bathroom, or participating in a sexual activity.
In this case, the Court noted that there was no allegation suggesting that the complainant was involved in any such private act. The Court further observed that, although the High Court had already acknowledged that the FIR did not disclose the offence of voyeurism, it still declined to discharge the appellant—a decision the Supreme Court deemed unsustainable.
Regarding the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, the Court observed that the FIR did not allege any threat to the complainant’s person, property, or reputation—an essential element of the offence.
The allegation of wrongful restraint was also examined. The Court noted that there was no evidence indicating that the complainant was a tenant; the records showed only that she had visited the property as a prospective tenant to inspect the premises. The Court further observed that allowing a tenant to enter would have contravened the civil court’s injunction. Consequently, it concluded that the accused had acted under a bona fide belief that he was entitled to prevent entry into the property in light of the existing injunction.
In this context, the Court concluded that the FIR stemmed entirely from the family’s ongoing civil dispute over the property. It noted that, even if the allegations were taken at face value, they related solely to issues that should be addressed through civil remedies—such as injunctions or applications in the pending suit—rather than through criminal proceedings.
The Bench further criticised the practice of filing chargesheets in cases lacking a strong basis of suspicion, noting that such actions impose an undue burden on the criminal justice system.
“The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs. Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process,” the Court said.
Consequently, the Court upheld the appeal and acquitted the appellant of all charges.
